Prior research suggests that US capital markets have more difficulty identifying and incorporating bad news into stock prices than they do good news due to the paucity of sources of negative firm-specific information. Even though insider selling is a potentially important proxy for undisclosed bad news, the literature has failed to document consistent evidence of insiders' sale transactions being informative. The lack of information in insider sales is attributed to researchers' inability to separate liquidity-motivated from information-based insider trades. We use a novel approach to classify insider sales as either liquidity-motivated or information-based by evaluating the trades of individuals classified as insiders in multiple firms (multiple-firm insiders, which includes officers, directors, and blockholders). We argue that when multiplefirm insiders sell shares of one firm and buy shares of other firms in which they are insiders in the same month, that sale is more likely to be information-based. In contrast, when a multiplefirm insider sells shares of more than one firm in which she is an insider without a concomitant buy, that sale is more likely to be driven by liquidity needs. Using this proxy yields reliably negative associations between abnormal returns and information-based sales. From three to 36 months following the sale, the difference in median abnormal returns between information-based and liquidity-motivated insider sales increases in magnitude from -0.29% to -8.25%. Regression analysis finds significantly more negative returns for the information-based sales sample, even after controlling for risk and other factors that are expected to be related to both returns and insider trading. We conclude that it is possible to ex ante and directly identify insider sales transactions with significant information content. Our results will be of interest to investors as well as to regulators designing insider trading rules, in view of the paucity of mechanisms for revealing negative information to the capital market.
Introduction
Preceding the collapse of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns in 2008, executives at both banks sold large numbers of shares and options in their respective banks. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010) estimate that over the years [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , the top-five executive teams at Bear Stearns and Lehman sold about $1.1 billion and $860 million respectively in shares and options.
By 2008, executives of both firms had sold more shares than they had remaining at the time of the collapse. In fact, while the executives were selling their shares, the share prices of both banks had quadrupled from 2000 to the end of 2007, a few months before the banks collapsed.
This anecdote illustrates two points about the US capital market's ability to find and incorporate firm-specific bad news into stock prices. First, there appears to be a paucity of sources of bad news available to the market: the banks apparently lacked a sufficiently strong incentive to disclose the bad news on a timely basis; analysts were unwilling or unable to develop and disclose the negative information (see McNichols and O'Brien 1997) ; and investors either were unable to discover the information prior to the crash or were able to infer the bad news but unable to trade on it because of short selling restrictions (see Diamond and Verrecchia 1987 and Staley 1997) . Second, insiders were aware of the information far in advance of its discovery by the market. If the capital market was able to correctly infer the insiders' information from their trading activity and insiders were allowed to trade without restriction, stock prices would have incorporated the inside information much more rapidly and stock prices would have been more efficient.
The information in insiders' sales may be particularly relevant for capital markets due to the paucity of mechanisms for revealing negative information. However, prior research on the information content of insiders' sell transactions has produced mixed results. This lack of evidence on insiders' sales is usually attributed to the fact that many sales are for liquidity reasons and it is difficult ex ante to distinguish liquidity-motivated from information-based sales. 1 We develop an approach to identify information-based insider sales using trades of multiple-firm insiders. 2 We propose that when a multiple-firm insider sells shares of a single firm but during the same trading month she purchases shares of at least one other affiliated firm, that sale is more likely to be information-based since the proceeds are reinvested in other affiliated firms. 3 In contrast, an insider who sells shares of more than one firm without a concomitant purchase is more likely to be trading for liquidity reasons since the proceeds are not reinvested.
There is little disagreement that insiders are privy to information, both negative and positive, long before it becomes available to the markets. By trading on this private information, insiders are able to earn significantly higher returns or avoid major losses. The empirical literature finds that insiders' buy transactions provide new information to the market, consistent with economic theory. The preponderance of liquidity driven sales has, however, made it difficult to establish a relationship between insider sales and abnormal returns (Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser 2003; Hsieh, Ng, and Wang 2006; Brochet 2010; 1 Most of the literature on insider trading uses only open market buy and sell transactions. Since exercising options does not result in an open market purchase but the sale of the shares covered by the options results in an open market sale, the data contain many more sales than buys. Thus the probability of a liquidity-motivated insider sell transaction is very high. See Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003) for further discussion of the open market data. Mixing many liquidity-motivated sales with far fewer information-based sales dampens the effect of sales on average and makes it more difficult to find an association between insider sales and abnormal returns. An algorithm for determining whether an insider sale is information-based may therefore lead to a profitable trading strategy. 2 We refer to the firms with which an individual has insider status as "affiliated firms". Our sample of insiders includes officers, directors, and blockholders, as described in section 3.
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Alternatively, concurrently selling one affiliated firm's stock and buying another affiliated firm's stock may be motivated by a need to rebalance the insider's portfolio. See Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003) for evidence that insiders sell stock with good growth prospects and recent performance. Including these potentially rebalancing transactions in our data biases against rejecting our hypothesis. To control for sell transactions involving securities that are overweight because of high prior performance, we include a proxy for momentum in our analyses. Ravina and Sapienza 2010; Jagolinzer, Larcker, and Taylor 2011) , with the exception of two papers which have found a relationship between insider sales and short-term future abnormal returns (Cohen, Malloy, and Pomeroski 2012; Scott and Xu 2004) . This inability to separate information based sales from liquidity based sales has also been discussed in the financial press. Serchuk (2009), for example, argues that even though insiders buy in anticipation of good news, they sell for all kinds of reasons and not necessarily because they expect their companies' stock prices to sink.
Insider trading on material nonpublic information is commonly restricted or banned to avoid uninformed traders engaging to their information disadvantage in transactions with firms'
insiders. Some research holds that allowing insiders to trade on private information increases stock price efficiency by allowing the information to be rapidly incorporated in price 1996; Rozeff and Zaman 1988; Seyhun 1992 and 1998 , among many others).
However, other law and economics researchers assert that insider trading is unethical because the information belongs to the firm and is expropriated by the insider for profit, and that insider trading does not make prices more efficient because it diminishes other traders' incentives to find and analyze information (Grundfest 1986; Beny 2007) .
Information driven insider sales are likely to be a very powerful mechanism for bad news to be impounded in market prices. Most investors can only directly sell securities that they hold, even if they are skeptical about a firm's prospects. In addition, there are a number of constraints on short-selling which make it both expensive and risky (Staley 1997, Diamond and Verrecchia 1987) . Prior evidence suggests that analysts are reluctant to cover firms with weak prospects (McNichols and O'Brien 1997) , and although some evidence suggests that short sellers act as information intermediaries (Pownall and Simko 2005) , there are significant costs associated with short-selling. On the other hand, Khan and Lu (2013) find significant increases in short sales prior to large insider sales which they attribute to front-running inside information. If the firm is reluctant to directly and voluntarily disclose bad news (Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009) , the insider's information may be indirectly revealed to the market as she follows her profit motive to sell shares on her own account.
Using this method to classify insider sales, we find that the market-adjusted returns to information-based sales are on average 1.18% lower than the returns to liquidity-motivated sales in the three months following the sale, with the difference increasing to 8.73% over three years.
The difference in median returns over this period is even more compelling, -0.29% over three months increasing to -8.52% over three years. Our results are unchanged using regression analyses and controlling for multiple other factors associated with returns. Specifically, even though liquidity-motivated sales do not earn significant abnormal returns over the six different return horizons, information-based sales exhibit significantly more negative risk-adjusted returns of 5.08% in the six-month period, decreasing to -8.21%, -9.10%, and -8.29% in the first, second and third year following the trading month, respectively.
To examine whether the difference in returns is concentrated in firms with other identifiable risk characteristics that may be associated with the amount of information available about the firm, we also partition the sample on both book to market (B/M) and log of total assets (SIZE). We find that the difference in market-adjusted returns between liquidity-motivated and information-based sales is most pronounced for small firms with high B/M. For these firms the mean (median) difference in returns in the three month window is -2.50% (-0.83%) increasing to -21.40% (-31.02%) over three years. The more pronounced results for small firms with high B/M are consistent with the risks and costs of short-selling being larger and the availability of information being lower for these firms.
Our algorithm identifies a very small percentage of all insider sales as information-based (about 0.5%), because only the sales of officers, directors, and blockholders who have insider relationships with more than one firm have the data to apply the approach. This almost certainly understates the true incidence of information-based insider sales. However, the insider sales we identify are most likely to be information-based, and therefore should be relevant for the SEC and to investors.
Our paper adds to the literature on insider sales in three important ways. First, our results suggest that examining an insider's sales in conjunction with her purchases is effective in separating information-based from liquidity-motivated sales. We demonstrate that insiders can serve as information intermediaries with respect to negative news, much in advance of the realization of the bad news. Second, our measure can ex ante identify informed insider sales, an inherently difficult task given the confounding effects of liquidity driven sales. Not only does our method ex ante identifies informed sales but it is also much less data intensive. Unlike the measure developed by Cohen et al. (2012) , which requires historical trading data for each insider to classify their trades as "routine trades" and treat the residual as "informed trades" our measure directly identifies information-based sales using only the current month trading information for an insider. Finally, we examine the return performance of insider sales over long windows and document significant negative return performance for information-based sales that extends up to three years into the future. The relatively long horizon of the news in the information-based insider sales identified using our method precludes the likelihood that this information is disseminated through other mechanisms or detected by regulators.
Overall, our results demonstrate that insiders can serve as information intermediaries with respect to negative news and their sales can convey long-term information. Being able to identify information-based sales, especially over a long-horizon, will be helpful to investors, financial analysts and other capital market participants as they evaluate the prospects of firms to make investment decisions or recommendations. This information may also be useful to credit rating agencies and auditors as information based insider sales may help them identify risks earlier. As the time horizon of the bad news revealed by these insider sales is relatively longer, these insider sales are unlikely to be detected by regulators using the normal procedures. Consequently, our results are particularly relevant to regulators designing insider trading rules in view of the paucity of mechanisms for revealing negative information to the capital market (see among others, Maffett, Owens, and Srinivasan 2013 , McNichols and O'Brien 1997 , and Pownall and Simko 2005 .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on insider trading and that on mechanisms for bad news to be reflected in stock prices, and develops our hypothesis. Section 3 describes our sample, data, and empirical design. Section 4 reports results; diagnostics and extensions are in section 5. Section 6 provides a summary and suggestions for future research.
Background and Hypothesis development
Extant research suggests that managers release both good news and bad news strategically (see Healy and Palepu 2001 for a discussion of the factors affecting management's voluntary disclosure decisions). Moreover, managers' incentives to release good news and bad news are asymmetrical. Under certain circumstances, managers may have reasons to accelerate the disclosure of bad news but in other cases, there may be reasons to delay this disclosure.
For instance, Kothari et al. (2009) hypothesize that a range of incentives, including career concerns, motivates managers to withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but quickly reveal good news to investors. Consistent with management withholding bad news, they find that both the magnitude of dividend changes and the associated five-day market reactions are more pronounced for dividend cuts than for dividend increases. They also show that the magnitude of the five-day market reaction to bad news earnings forecasts exceeds that of good news forecasts.
They conclude that the higher price reaction for bad news events indicates that management is successful in withholding the bad news from investors until it becomes inevitable that it will be released. Similarly, in their survey of CFOs, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) find that managers delay bad news disclosures in the hope that they may never have to release the bad news if the firm's status improves before the required information release.
In addition, managers may have reasons to accelerate the disclosure of bad news to the market to reduce litigation costs. Skinner (1994 Skinner ( , 1997 finds that firms with bad earnings news are more than twice as likely to pre-disclose poor performance as firms with good news in order to avoid litigation. Although Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994) find that pre-disclosure does not appear to deter litigation, Field, Lowry and Shu (2005) find some evidence that disclosure can deter certain types of litigation. Other research (Miller and Piotroski, 2000) finds that litigation risk is not relevant just for firms with bad news, but also for those with good news.
Not only are there incentives for managers to withhold bad news, other information intermediaries also tend to avoid bad news disclosures. For instance, one of the major sources of information outside the firm is financial analysts, but prior research has documented that there are systematic biases in analyst recommendations. Analysts face pressure to be optimistic about the firms they follow due to career concerns, and the desire to increase their employers' revenue from trading commissions or investment banking deals. 4 For example, McNichols and O'Brien (1997) examine the bias in analyst forecasts and find that the optimism documented in prior research arises from analysts being overly optimistic about the firms they start covering and at the same time dropping coverage of firms about whose prospects they are pessimistic. Thus, analysts' tendency to either issue optimistic reports or stop covering firms they expect will perform poorly in future eliminates an important source of 'independent' information for firms with bad news.
Another potential source of negative information about firms is short-sellers. When analysts suppress bad news about firms by dropping coverage or optimistically biasing their reports, short sellers' role as information intermediaries acquires greater significance. Pownall and Simko (2005) show that the abnormal returns to short-sell spikes are significantly bigger when there are fewer analysts following the firm, consistent with short sales being more informative when there are limited alternative sources of guidance. Similarly, insider sales could be an important source of negative information about the firm if it is possible to distinguish information-based from liquidity-motivated insider sales.
The literature on insider trading establishes that insiders have superior access to information (e.g. Jaffe 1974 , Seyhun 1986 insider sales but fail to find a negative CAR after the sale. In contrast, an insider purchase is preceded by negative CAR of about 2% over the preceding 100 days and positive CAR of 6% over the subsequent 100 days. The lack of abnormal returns associated with insider sales has been regarded as evidence of the difficulty of separating information-based insider sales from liquidity-motivated insider sales.
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Although research on insider selling has found mixed results on the information content of insider sales, research examining insider sales around bad news events is unambiguous. Once an adverse news event is identified, research has shown that insiders sell their stocks before the news become public. Papers that document this association are: Noe (1999) , who finds significantly negative abnormal returns in the twenty days following insider sales after a management earnings forecast; Beneish (1999) , who finds abnormal returns associated with insider sales in the period prior to the discovery of an earnings overstatement 6 ; Ke, Huddart, and Petroni (2003) , who find an increase in the frequency of insider sales as early as two years to nine months before a break in consecutive earnings increases, but little evidence of increased insider trading in the two quarters immediately preceding the break; Huddart, Ke, and Shi (2007) , who find that insiders trade on foreknowledge of a 10-Q or 10-K filing but 5 Jeng et al. (2003) note that "Overall we expect insider purchases are more likely than sales to be information driven." Similarly, Ravina and Sapienza (2010) document significantly positive future returns to insider purchases, but they fail to document significant abnormal returns to insider sales, a result they attribute to sales being primarily driven by liquidity reasons and not by information. 6 Beneish and Vargus (2002) and Cheng and Lo (2005) find that insider trading is associated with earnings management and the timing of voluntary disclosures, respectively.
foreknowledge of good news does not have a different marginal effect on insider trading than foreknowledge of bad news; Jagolinzer (2009), who finds that insiders initiate rule 10b5-1sales plans before poor firm performance; Roychowdhury and Sletten (2013) , who find that higher earnings informativeness in bad news quarters is more pronounced when insiders are net sellers;
and Ravina and Sapienza (2010) , who find that insiders outperform the market when they condition selling activity on two bad news events: large stock price declines and earnings restatements.
Although insider sales can be informative when conditioned on a future adverse event the information content of such sales can only be established ex post. Given the paucity of sources of bad news and the possible delay in bad news reaching the market, the ability to isolate insider sales motivated by foreknowledge of bad news becomes even more critical.
Our mechanism for separating information based sales from liquidity driven sales is predicated on the notion that if insiders are selling for liquidity reasons, they need the proceeds from the sale and consequently will choose to not reinvest them in shares of other firms.
However, if the sales are being driven by negative expectations of future firm performance and not by the insiders' liquidity needs, the insiders will choose to reinvest the proceeds in other insider firms where they have higher expectations. Thus, we conjecture that when multiple-firm insiders sell shares of one affiliated firm and buy shares of other affiliated firms, the sale is more likely driven by information and not liquidity. Conversely, an insider sale not accompanied by a purchase of other affiliated firm shares is more likely to be driven by liquidity needs. This leads to our main hypothesis:
H1: Insider sales by multiple-firm insiders accompanied by purchases in other affiliated stocks are associated with more negative future abnormal returns than multiple-firm insider sales not accompanied by purchases.
The alternative to this hypothesis is that an insider sale accompanied by an affiliated firm purchase by the same insider may reflect portfolio rebalancing rather than exploiting inside information. Prior research has shown that insiders are contrarian traders, buying after poor performance and selling after good performance (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) . To the extent that portfolio rebalancing explains part of the multiple-firm insider sales in our test sample, the classification errors will bias against finding results consistent with our hypothesis.
Empirical Design and Sample
We hypothesize that insider sales of shares of a single firm accompanied by insider buys of shares of other affiliated firms are information-based and are likely to be associated with future firm performance. In contrast, insider sales of more than one firm without concomitant affiliated firm insider buys are likely to be liquidity-motivated and hence less informative about future firm performance. We test this hypothesis, using the following model: BHARt+n = α +β1D_INFORMEDijt + β2B/Mjt-1 + β3SIZEjt-1 + β4MOMENTUMjt-1 + β5CEOijt + β6ROAjt-1 + ε where i indexes insiders, j indexes firms, t indexes the month of the sale, and n is number of months following the sale. We conduct analyses at the insider-firm-month level (i, j, t). We cluster the standard errors by industry and year.
Our measure of future firm performance is buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) computed for one, three, six, 12, 24, and 36 months following the insider sale. 7 BHAR is computed by compounding returns for firm i and subtracting compounded market returns for the same period.
Our variable of interest is D_INFORMED. It is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the sale is information-based and 0 if the sale is liquidity-motivated. We expect that future firm performance associated with information-based sales should be worse than future firm performance associated with liquidity-motivated sales, or β1 < 0.
To control for other factors that have been shown to be associated with market returns we include book to market and size in our tests (Fama and French, 1993) . Book to market, B/M, is the book value divided by market value of common equity at the end of the quarter prior to the trading month. We measure SIZE as the log of total assets at the end of the quarter prior to the insider sale month. We also control for price momentum, MOMENTUM, in our model. Prior research like Carhart (1997) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) finds that firms that performed well in the past are likely to continue to perform well in the future. However, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) also find that these gains partially reverse over horizons longer than one year.
Additionally, prior research on insider trading has shown that insiders are contrarian traders more likely to buy following low stock returns and less likely to buy after high stock returns (see for example, Rozeff and Zaman, 1998; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005) .
We measure MOMENTUM as cumulative returns in the six months before the month of sale 7 Our analysis is based on an insider's trading activity in a given month so we start cumulating returns at the beginning of the following month. For ease of reference, however, we refer to returns following the insider trade instead of returns at the beginning of the month following the trade. (Huddart, Ke and Shi, 2007) . Following prior research, we expect the coefficient on MOMENTUM to be negative.
To examine whether there is a difference in the information content of trades of the CEO and Chairman of the Board compared to other insiders, we include an indicator variable, CEO, equal to 1 if the insider selling the shares is either the CEO or Chairman of the Board. We do not predict the sign of CEO because Ravina and Sapienza (2010) do not find a difference in the returns associated with the trades of independent directors and executives. In addition, we control for the effects of current profitability on future abnormal returns by including a measure of operating profitability, ROA. ROA is measured as net income divided by average total assets for the quarter ending before month t. We expect firms with higher ROA to have higher returns so we predict a positive sign on ROA.
We collect insider trading data from the Thomson Reuters TFN Insider Filing Database.
The data come from SEC Form 4. 8 To ensure that our sample period is not affected by the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, we use data from 2003 to 2011. SOX significantly affected many corporate governance provisions, including regulations related to insider trading (Brochet, 2010) . For instance, SOX Section 403 requires insiders to report their trades on SEC Form 4 within two business days of the trade rather than the pre-SOX filing deadline of 10 days, and SOX Section 306(a) (Reg. BTR) prohibits insider trades during pension 8 Officers, directors, and beneficial owners of more than 10% of the stock are required to report their trades to the SEC on Forms 3, 4, and 5. Form 3 is filed within 10 days of becoming an officer, director, or beneficial owner; Form 4 is filed for a change in ownership within two days for every subsequent trade; and Form 5 is for any transactions that should have been reported on Form 4 which were not filed within the two day deadline and any transaction for which the SEC allows deferred reporting. We only include transactions reported on Form 4 since those are the only ownership changes that are due to insider trades. We aggregate all trades by insider i in company j during month t. If the purchases (sales)
for insider i for firm j in month t exceed the sales (purchases), we treat insider i as being a net buyer (seller) of firm j in month t. We perform the analysis at the month level to align insider trades in different stocks in time. Aggregating insider trades by firm and month results in a sample with 435,993 insider-month-firm observations for 423,586 insider-months. We delete monthly observations for each insider-firm pair with missing data on the number of shares traded for at least one underlying transaction, losing 223 insider-month observations. We retain only monthly insider-firm transactions that have been verified (coded 'R'), cleansed with a high level of confidence (coded 'H'), or for which some cleansing action has been undertaken but without complete verification (coded 'L'). These requirements result in an initial sample of 418,631
insider-firm-month observations representing a total of 408,426 insider months. Consistent with prior research (Ravina and Sapienza 2010) Of the 6,482 multiple-firm trade months, insiders sold shares of 3,956 firms without any insider-purchases in 1,840 insider months (see also table 2, panel B). We treat these sales as liquidity-motivated sales since the proceeds from these transactions were not reinvested. Insiders sold shares of a single firm and bought shares in one or more firms in 1,394 insider-months, in 1,215 of which they sold shares in one firm and purchased shares in one other firm. In the other 179 insider-months, insiders sold shares of one firm and purchased shares of multiple affiliated firms. We classified these two types of trades together (N=1,394) as information-based, since insiders are selling shares in one company and using the proceeds to purchase shares of one or more other insider-firms for which they also have access to superior information.
Since we focus on multiple trades by an insider in one month, panel D of and in the rest of the trading months insiders transacted in more than four -firms. We compute BHAR for one, three, six, 12, 24, and 36 months following the trading month. Of the total 1,394 information-based sales, 1,166 have available return data on CRSP to compute BHAR for the six return intervals and also have non-missing B/M and SIZE data. We lose five more observations in calculating price momentum resulting in a final sample of 1,161
observations. Applying the same data requirements to the trades classified as liquidity-motivated reduces the corresponding number of observations from 3,956 to 3,254. Our primary results use the full sample of BHAR observations, although the distribution is right-skewed. However, our inferences are robust to using winsorized data and to using median regressions to minimize the effects of the right-tail outliers. All accounting data are from COMPUSTAT. and this pattern is stronger in longer return windows. Buy-and-hold returns do not exhibit any significant difference between the two samples for the first month following the trade, but the difference in returns between the two samples widens as the period lengthens. In the three months following the trade, the mean (median) return for the information-based sales is lower than that of the liquidity-motivated sales sample by 1.18% (0.03%), and this difference grows to 8.49% (3.39%) in 12 months. Thereafter, the mean difference between information-based and liquidity-motivated sales exhibits modest growth for 24 months after the sale to 9.44% and a slight reversal at 36 months to 8.73%, but the difference in median returns over this period is striking.
After one year the median returns to information-based sales are 3.39% lower than the median returns to liquidity-motivated sales, and this difference grows by almost two and a half times to 8.52% after three years. Three years following the trade, information-based insider sales earn -9.41% market adjusted returns compared to -0.89% for liquidity-motivated insider sales.
All mean (median) differences are significant at 1% for all periods longer than three (six) months. Additionally, the median differences for three and six months are significant at 10% and 5%, respectively.
These results support our hypothesis that insider sales accompanied by insider purchases are more likely to be information-based, signaling future poor performance that persists for three years. In contrast insider sales of multiple firms not accompanied by insider buys are more likely to be liquidity-motivated and hence not useful for conveying adverse news.
Panel B of table 3 presents mean and median differences between the information-based and liquidity-motivated sales for all explanatory variables used in the analyses. There are no significant differences between the two groups' MOMENTUM, B/M, and ROA in the quarter prior to the trading month. The median SIZE is marginally larger (at 10%) for the liquiditymotivated sales group but the mean SIZE is not significantly different between the two groups.
The similarity between the two groups in important firm characteristics increases confidence in our results and we conclude that the return differences we document are not attributable to fundamental differences between the two groups, which is especially important for long-horizon event studies (Barber and Lyon 1997) . The only difference between the two groups is that the Chairman and CEO are more likely to engage in information-based rather than liquiditymotivated sales, consistent with the descriptive evidence presented in panel C of table 2. is not stable -it is significantly negative for the three-month BHAR but significantly positive for BHAR in two and three year intervals following the sale. The table also suggests that MOMENTUM is negatively associated with future return performance in horizons of six months and longer. Finally, consistent with prior research we do not find that the CEO's and Chairman's trades are more likely to be information-based than those of other insiders while the positive correlation at 36 months points to the opposite conclusion.
Results
To determine whether we can characterize the firms for which insider sales are more likely to be information-based, table 5 presents evidence on the mean and median BHAR associated with insider sales over the six return windows after splitting the sample into four subgroups based on the median values of B/M and SIZE (Fama and French 1993) . We computed the medians for the overall sample of both information-based and liquidity-motivated sales. First we present the median and mean returns for the sub-set of insider sales for firms with B/M above and SIZE below the median values for the entire sample, High B/M and small SIZE. The difference in the BHAR between information-based and liquidity-motivated sales is strikingly large, particularly at long horizons. Six months after the sale, the difference in median (mean)
BHAR for this subsample is -5.89% (-11.84%), and 36 months after the sale the difference widens to -21.4% (-31.20 %). The differences in returns in the last four return windows are not only economically significant, but also statistically significant at 1%. Although most of the difference in median returns between the two samples comes from the poor performance of information-based sales (-22.65% for three years), the mean difference is driven at least in part by the good performance of liquidity-motivated sales (24.07% over three years). However, the large positive mean returns to the liquidity motivated sales may be driven by outliers, as suggested by the median returns which are slightly negative over this period (-1.25%).
Furthermore, this analysis does not adequately control for risk, as the following table (table 6) indicates that the returns to liquidity based sales are not significantly different from zero.
Next, we examine the return performance of insider sales for large firms with high B/M (High B/M and large SIZE). The difference in both mean and median returns between information-based and liquidity-motivated sales for this subsample is negative but smaller in magnitude and significance than for small firms with high B/M. The difference in median and mean returns peaks one year after the sale at -3.02 % and -10.06% respectively, but only the mean difference is statistically significant at 1%, while the median difference is only marginally significant. Similarly, the difference in returns between information-based and liquiditymotivated insider sales for firms with low B/M and small SIZE is neither large nor statistically significant.
The last subsample is low B/M and large SIZE. In this subsample the difference in median returns between information-based and liquidity-motivated sales is economically large though only marginally significant at long horizons. Two (three) years after the sale informationbased sales are associated with median returns of -1.75% (-5.15%) compared to 4.73% (4.99%)
for liquidity-motivated sales, significant at 5% (10%). Information-based sales underperform the market but liquidity-motivated sales do better than the market, again consistent with only information-based and not liquidity-motivated sales being associated with future bad news. The difference in mean returns between the two sub-samples is small, and both information-based and liquidity-motivated sales outperform the market at both the 24 and 36 months intervals.
In sum, we find the greatest difference in the returns between information-based and liquidity-motivated insider sales in small firms with high B/M. These are likely to be firms for which less information is available and the information content of insider sales may be most valuable to the capital market. The negative returns are stronger in longer horizons, suggesting that our method identifies insider sales with information well in advance of the time when this information otherwise becomes public.
Our regression results examining the returns to information-based versus liquiditymotivated insider sales are presented in table 6. In panel A we present analyses controlling for other factors that prior research has shown to be related to returns for our six return windows, clustering standard errors by year and industry. The first column for each return window reports regression results for a parsimonious model that contains only our proxy for information-based sales, D_INFORMED, and risk factors that are traditionally associated with returns viz., B/M and SIZE (Fama and French, 1993) . The second column in each return window adds other factors that may be related to both returns and insider trading namely, MOMENTUM, CEO, and ROA. suggest that insiders more likely to possess proprietary information are also more likely to be information-based traders except at the one-month return window, where the coefficient on CEO is significantly negative at the 10% level.
Since we are examining the incremental returns to information based insider sales over liquidity based sales, we have not winsorized the returns in our analyses in table 6, panel A.
However, to understand how much of the additional returns to information based insider sales are driven by large outliers, we also run median regressions, where the coefficients on D_INFORMED are not influenced by outliers. Panel B of table 6 presents the results of our analyses using median regressions. We include industry and year fixed effects in this analyses.
The results using median analyses are similar to the results from OLS analyses in sales from 24 to 36-months. Specifically, information -based sales exhibit median market adjusted returns that are more negative than those of the liquidity-motivated sample by 1.45% in the first six months following the trade, decreasing to -8.58% three years after. As fixed effects are included in the model, it is not possible to interpret the intercept as the median returns to liquidity based sales.
In this analysis, B/M is significantly positive at 10% or better for most return intervals.
However, the coefficient on SIZE although significant is in the opposite direction than predicted over most of the returns windows. Furthermore, ROA now becomes significantly positive for all return windows, consistent with expectations. The results for MOMENTUM are unchanged.
In untabulated analyses, we also run the analyses in Table 6 , panel A, using industry and fixed effects instead of clustering standard errors. Our results are stronger with industry and year fixed effects. We also run the analyses after winsorizing the returns at 1% on both ends and our results are unchanged.
Taken together our results suggest that insiders use proprietary negative information about their affiliated firms by selling stock one to three years before the negative performance is realized. This result is consistent with the evidence in Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003) who find that insiders increase their sales three to nine quarters prior to a break in a string of consecutive increases in quarterly earnings. 
Diagnostics and Extensions
In table 7 we present results using a different sample for liquidity-motivated sales, namely insider sales of a single firm which are unaccompanied by any insider purchases.
Specifically, D_INFORMED takes the value 0 when the director sells only one firm in a given month and does not buy any other affiliated firm. As in the main analyses, D_INFORMED takes the value 1 when the insider sells shares of only one firm in a given month and buys at least one other. Since the incidence of liquidity-motivated sales (N = 250,165) in this sample is more than 200 times that of information-based sales (N=1,166), to enhance comparability across the two groups, we match the groups on industry and size retaining in the liquidity-motivated group only those sales that happen within 12 months of each information-based sale. This procedure results in a total of 3,957 liquidity-motivated sales.
Panel A of table 7compares the returns of the two samples across the six return horizons.
Consistent with the evidence presented in panel A of table 3, BHAR of information-based sales are associated with significantly more negative mean returns than liquidity-motivated sales at 10 Our results are robust to the inclusion of a variable capturing the size of the insider's sale compared to her previous position in the stock even though including this variable results in a substantial loss of observations.
horizons of six-months and longer, except for the 24-month horizon where the difference in returns is negative by 2.74% but not statistically significant. The median returns are more negative and statistically significant at 1% for the information-based sales in all return windows except for the one-month. Specifically the difference in returns is monotonically decreasing from -0.9% in the three month horizon reaching -4.41% in 3 years. The economic significance of returns is admittedly smaller than the one documented in table 3, as we would expect since unlike sales of multiple firms, the sale of a single firm cannot be unequivocally attributed to the insider's liquidity needs.
This result is corroborated by the regression analysis presented in panel B. The table presents both mean and median regression results based on the parsimonious model of table 6.
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Similar to the results in Table 6 , liquidity-motivated sales are not related to poor future performance as indicated by the insignificant intercepts in all six return windows. In contrast, information-based sales exhibit more negative returns in both models of all windows longer than three months except for the mean regression analysis of the 24-month window. Median regression results, in particular, exhibit a monotonic decrease in returns for the informationbased sample of -4.05% in the 12-month, -5.12% in the 24-month and -6.78% in the 36-month windows following the trade. This difference in returns is not only economically relevant but also statistically significant at the 1% level. These results thus provide additional support that our algorithm is successful in identifying information-based insider sales well in advance of the time bad news is revealed to the market.
Conclusion
11 Results for the full model are similar, albeit, weaker.
. There are few sources of bad news available to capital market participants. Managers delay releasing bad news and analysts, another important information source, are likely to discontinue following firms with poor performance. This makes short-sellers extremely important for dissemination of bad news but there are a number of constraints on short-selling.
Sales of shares by insiders are another potential mechanism for the dissemination of bad news to the market. However, prior research shows that although insider purchases are informative about future firm performance, it is difficult to detect information in insider sales since a vast majority of the sales transactions are undertaken for liquidity reasons and do not reflect private information. Given the importance of the information in insider sales, a mechanism to separate liquidity-motivated insider sales from information-based insider sales is relevant not only to investors and other market participants but also to regulators and the courts.
In this paper, we separate information-based insider sales from liquidity-motivated insider sales using the trades of insiders who trade in multiple firms during one month. We conjecture that the sales of an insider who both buys and sells affiliated firms' stock in one month are likely to be information-based. In contrast, multiple sales without any accompanying buys are more likely to be liquidity-motivated.
Using this method to classify insider sales, we find that information-based sales are associated with significantly lower returns over intervals ranging from six months to three years.
Market-adjusted returns to information-based sales are on average 1.18% lower than the returns to liquidity-motivated in the three months following the sale, with the difference increasing to -8.73% over three years. The difference in median returns is even more compelling, -0.29% over three months increasing to -8.52% over three years.
To examine whether the difference in returns is concentrated in firms about which less information is available or which are riskier or more costly to sell short, we also split the sample on book to market (B/M) and log of total assets (SIZE). We find that the difference in returns between information-based and liquidity-motivated sales is most pronounced for high B/M and small SIZE firms. For these firms the mean (median) difference in returns at three months is -0.83% (-2.51%), increasing to -21.40% (-31.20%) over three years.
Regression analyses corroborate these results. Specifically we find that even though insider sales classified as liquidity-motivated do not exhibit any association with future returns, information-based sales exhibit more negative returns that are statistically significant in return windows of 6-months and longer following the trade. In twelve months following the sale abnormal returns reach -8.21% and continue to be negative and significant up three years after the sale. Median regression results provide consistent results. Finally, we test the sensitivity of our analyses, by analyzing an alternative sample of liquidity-motivated sales, consisting of insider sales of a single firm in a month without any accompanying insider purchases matched by year, industry and size. Results using this alternative sample are broadly consistent with our main results.
To summarize, using a sample of insider sales from the period 2003-2011, we show that comparing multiple-firm insiders' sales to their trading activity in other affiliated firms during the same month can be an effective way to separate information-based from liquidity-motivated sales. The inability of prior research to document the information content in insider sales has been attributed to insiders being more likely to sell for liquidity reasons. However, the paucity of other mechanisms for disseminating bad news increases the importance of insider sales to provide adverse news about firms. Using the method in this paper, it is possible to infer bad news from insider sales as much as three years before the market. 
